Abstract: Fair exchange protocols allow both or neither of two parties to obtain the other's items, and this property is essential in e-commerce. In this paper, we construct an optimistic fair exchange protocol that is applicable to any digital signature by prescribing three forms of signatures, namely presignature, post-signature and notarised signature. We set an expiration date for presignature, and thus realise the timely termination of the protocol. Next, we define an ideal functionality of fair exchange protocols in the universal composability framework. Then, we construct an optimistic fair exchange protocol based on the above protocol, and prove its security in the universal composability framework.
Introduction
Fair exchange is an essential property in e-commerce, and various protocols have been proposed for realising fair exchange including gradual secret exchange (Even et al., 1985; Okamoto and Ohta, 1994) , non-repudiation Gollmann, 1996, 1997) and optimistic fair exchange. Optimistic fair exchange protocols allow both or neither of two involved parties to obtain the other's items, where a Trusted Third Party (TTP) is not invoked when the two involved parties perform the protocol correctly. This kind of protocol is more practical than those in which TTP mediates all transactions. Many approaches have been employed to realise this kind of protocol (Asokan et al., 2000; Ateniese, 1999; Bao et al., 1998; Dodis and Reyzin, 2003; Park et al., 2003) . Optimistic fair exchange protocols can be categorised by the data to be exchanged such as the exchange of digital signatures on two different messages, the exchange of digital signatures on the same message, and the exchange of a digital signature and digital data. Here we consider protocols that exchange a digital signature and digital data.
In this paper, we construct an optimistic fair exchange protocol that is applicable to any digital signature scheme such as RSA or DSA by prescribing the form of signatures, and prove the security of optimistic fair exchange protocols in the universal composability framework, which was proposed by . This framework provides a unified methodology for proving the security of various protocols. Furthermore, in the universal composability framework, it is guaranteed that a secure primitive maintains its security even if other primitives run concurrently. Since optimistic fair exchange protocols use many primitives such as digital signatures, secure channels and certificate authorities, this property is very helpful. Our optimistic fair exchange protocol can employ any secure digital signature, so it is easy to handle within the universal composability framework by using the hybrid protocol. Asokan et al. (2000) proposed an optimistic fair exchange protocol that uses verifiable escrow. To use TTP as an escrow service, a signer encrypts his/her signature under the public key of TTP. Verifiable escrow is an encryption scheme with an attached decryption policy that represents the conditions under which the encryption will be decrypted by TTP. First, the signer reduces his/her signature to a certain homomorphic preimage of the signature. The signer then verifiably escrows the homomorphic preimage using a cut-and-choose interactive zero-knowledge proof. This scheme is applicable to any signature as long as the signature scheme can be reduced to a certain homomorphic preimage of the signature. They introduced homomorphic presignatures for RSA, DSA, Schnorr, Fiat-Shamir signatures among others. The drawback of this protocol is that it is highly interactive and needs a large amount of computation. Bao et al. (1998) proposed a fair exchange protocol with off-line TTP that uses Certificate of Encrypted Message Being a Signature (CEMBS). In this protocol, parties sign their messages (such as a contract) and encrypt their signatures. CEMBS is used to convince parties that an encrypted signature is a certain party's signature on a message without revealing the signature itself. To realise this property, CEMBS uses proof-of-knowledge techniques and has to utilise the combination of a particular public key cryptosystem and a digital signature scheme ( (Bao et al., 1998) used ElGamal and DSA or ElGamal and Gullou-Quisquater) . This ad hoc technique is not a desirable property. Boneh et al. (2003) recently proposed a new verifiably encrypted signature scheme based on the GDH signature of Boneh et al. (2001) . This scheme is completely non-interactive. Park et al. (2003) introduced an optimistic fair exchange protocol that uses the two-party multisignature scheme as a primitive element. We use the term two-signature to represent a two-party multisignature quoting from Dodis and Reyzin (2003) . Park et al. (2003) composed a two-signature scheme based on RSA signature, but Dodis and Reyzin (2003) broke this scheme. Recently, Boldyreva (2003) proposed a non-interactive multisignature scheme based on the GDH signature of Boneh et al. (2001) . Dodis and Reyzin (2003) introduced an optimistic fair exchange protocol by utilising the non-interactive multisignature of Boldyreva. The protocol of Dodis and Reyzin (2003) has two drawbacks. First, TTP has to safely store as many secret arbitration keys as the number of users. Next, it requires special elliptic curve groups with a bilinear map and a two-signature scheme.
Preliminaries

Optimistic fair exchange protocols
Universal composability framework
The universal composability framework, proposed by , is a general framework for analysing the security of cryptographic protocols. In this framework, the security of protocols is defined by comparing the executions of two protocols, a real process and an ideal process.
In the real process, a multiparty protocol is executed in a given environment in the presence of an adversary that controls the communication between the parties and can corrupt the parties. In the ideal process, there is an ideal functionality that captures the desired functionality for carrying out the task and performs as a subroutine of multiple parties. Parties in the ideal protocol, called dummy parties, forward input from the environment to the ideal functionality and send back reply directly.
The environment, which represents all the other protocols running in the system, passes input to and obtains output from the parties and the adversary, and finally outputs a single bit attempt to distinguish with which protocol is interacting. A protocol π is said to UC-realise an ideal functionality F if for any adversary A there is an ideal process adversary S (we often call the adversary S a simulator) such that no environment Z can tell whether it is interacting with π and A or with IDEAL F , which is the ideal protocol for F and S.
We use the following notation defined in The functionality shown in Figure 1 captures the fair exchange task, not just the optimistic task. Party T (this party, representing TTP, appears in the real protocol) does not appear explicitly in the ideal protocol for this functionality. Instead, the functionality itself plays the role of TTP. This difference between the ideal and real protocol poses no problem because there is no input or subroutine output from Z to T and back in either protocol.
Optimistic fair exchange protocol
Here we describe an optimistic fair exchange protocol that is applicable to any digital signature scheme such as RSA or DSA by prescribing the form of signatures. The parties involved in the protocol are Alice (customer), Bob (merchant) and TTP. In this paper, we consider exchange protocols where two involved parties exchange a digital signature for digital data. For example, Alice purchases digital data (e.g. music files, license keys) from Bob in exchange for her digital signature on the purchase contract. We do not consider digital data that allows Alice to obtain a benefit if she obtains multiple copies of the same digital data. This assumption is required when the dispute resolution protocol is invoked.
Definition of presignature, post-signature, and notarised signature
First, we define three types of signatures, presignature, post-signature and notarised signature, by prescribing the form of the signatures. We assume that the signature scheme consists of the triple of algorithm (KeyGen, Sign, Verify). We also assume that Alice and TTP have already generated their secret and public key pairs by executing KeyGen in the setup phase, and used PKI to certify their public keys. Presignature, post-signature and notarised signature are defined as follows.
Presignature: Alice's presignature is of the form
Post-signature: Alice's post-signature is of the form
Notarised signature: the notarised signature by TTP is of the form
The term M A represents the purchase contract. cert A and cert TTP indicate the certificates of Alice and TTP, respectively, and parameter t is the expiration date of the presignature. We introduce this parameter to realise the timely termination of the protocol. The presignature is Alice's signature on the concatenation of the purchase contract, Alice's public key certificate, TTP's public key certificate and the parameter that represents the expiration date of the presignature. The post-signature is Alice's signature on the concatenation of the purchase contract and Alice's public key certificate. The notarised signature is TTP's signature on Alice's presignature. We define both the post-signature and notarised signature as legally valid signatures. In addition, even if Bob shows both σ pre and σ TTP , these are regarded as one legally valid signature. On the other hand, the presignature is defined as a legally invalid signature. TTP has the power to transform Alice's presignature into a notarised signature that has the same legal value as a post-signature. 
Description of optimistic fair exchange protocol
We now construct an optimistic fair exchange protocol by using these signatures. It consists of two protocols, the main protocol and a dispute resolution protocol. In the protocols, we assume that data transactions are executed over secure channels established using techniques such as SSL. Alice initiates the main protocol with Bob. The main protocol is as described below.
Main protocol:
1 Alice sends her presignature to Bob.
2 Bob verifies the presignature and its expiration date. If either one is invalid, Bob aborts the protocol. Else, Bob sends his digital data to Alice.
3 Alice verifies the digital data. If it is invalid, she aborts the protocol. Else, Alice sends her post-signature to Bob.
4 Bob verifies the post-signature. If it is invalid or Bob does not receive it by the expiration date of Alice's presignature, then Bob invokes the dispute resolution protocol. Else, the exchange protocol ends correctly.
Then, we describe the dispute resolution protocol. Bob initiates the protocol with TTP.
Dispute resolution protocol:
1 Bob sends Alice's presignature to TTP along with his digital data.
2 TTP verifies the presignature, its expiration date, and the digital data. If any one of them is invalid, TTP aborts the protocol. Else, TTP sends the notarized signature to Bob.
3 TTP also forwards Bob's digital data to Alice.
Bob has to send his digital data in Step 1 of the dispute resolution protocol and TTP forwards Bob's digital data to Alice in Step 3 is to prevent malicious Bob from obtaining the notarised signature without sending his digital data to Alice. In the dispute resolution protocol, the TTP's verification of the digital data may constitute a bottleneck, because it is difficult to associate the verification of digital data with a certain mathematical algorithm. To verify the digital data efficiently in practice, we propose the use of hash tables. We assume that there is a hash For practical purposes, we should prearrange when Bob invokes the dispute resolution protocol in cases where Alice does not send her post-signature. That is, for example, Bob will be able to have presignatures transformed into notarised signatures between the expiration date and the following day. After waiting for Alice's post-signature until the expiration date, Bob invokes the dispute resolution protocol during this period and obtains the notarised signature.
Protocol π OFE in the (F SIG , F REG , F SCS )-hybrid model
Next, we construct a hybrid protocol based on the protocol mentioned above, slightly modifying it to make it easier to handle within the universal composability framework. Here, we present a hybrid protocol for realising F 
In Figure 2, Step 2(e) corresponds to the resolution protocol. When neither A nor B is corrupted, party A correctly outputs (Sent, sid, M B ) in Step 2(d) and goes to
Step 3, because all messages between A and B are sent and received by using F SCS . There are two cases in which the resolution protocol is executed. One is where party A is corrupted by the adversary and instructed to send an invalid σ post . The other is where party B is corrupted and instructed to send an invalid M B . In this case, A enters the waiting state and goes to Step 2(e). The adversary can instruct corrupted B to send a resolve message to T . This hybrid protocol uses three ideal functionalities: F SIG , F REG and F SCS . We show the ideal functionalities F SIG , F REG and F SCS defined by in Figures 3-5 , respectively. We slightly modify F REG from the original one in . The modified registration functionality sends output (Registered, sid, v) to the party in order to specify clearly the activation of the key registering party. (b) Else, B sends (Get, sid) to T by using F SCS . Upon receiving (Get, sid), T sends σ TTP to B by using F SCS . Upon receiving σ TTP , B outputs (Sent, sid, M A , (σ pre , σ TTP )). Proof: Let S HYB be a hybrid protocol simulator that interacts with parties running π OFE in the (F SIG , F REG , F SCS )-hybrid model. We now construct a simulator S such that the view of the environment Z when interacting with S HYB and π OFE has the same distribution as Z when interacting with S and the ideal protocol for F FE . That is, for any S HYB there exists S such that EXEC π OFE ,S HYB ,Z ≈ EXEC IDEAL F ,S,Z for any environment Z. S runs an internal copy of S HYB as a black box, forwards any input from Z to S HYB and vice versa. S also runs an internal copy of each of the involved parties, and simulates F SIG , F REG and F SCS . The behaviour of S is described as follows.
Security of protocol π OFE
A case where no party is corrupted. When S receives (Initiate, sid, M A ) from F FE , where sid = (A, B, sid ) , it proceeds as follows:
1 S simulates the processes of key generation and registration. It sends the message (KeyGen, sid A ) to S HYB (in the name of F SIG ), and obtains (Verification Algorithm, sid A , s A , v A ) . (m, σ ) . Else, output an error message to S and halt.
Signature Verification: Upon receiving a value (Verify, sid, m, σ, v ) from some party V , do: If v = v, the signer is not corrupted, v(m, σ ) = 1, and no entry (m, σ ) for any σ is recorded, then output an error message to S and halt. Else, output (Verified, sid, m, v (m, σ ) ) to V .
Figure 4
The registration functionality, F REG Functionality F REG 1. Upon receiving input (Register, sid, v) , verify that sid = (P , sid ). If sid is not of that form, or this is not the first input from P , then ignore this input. Else, send (Registered, sid, v) to the adversary and record the value v. Then, send (Registered, sid, v) to P . 1. Upon receiving input (Establish-Session, sid) from party I , verify that sid = (I, R, sid ) for some R, record I as active, record R as the responder, and send a public delayed output (Establish-Session, sid) to R.
Upon receiving input
2. Upon receiving (Establish-Session, sid) from party R, verify that R is recorded as the responder, and record R as active.
3. Upon receiving input (Send, sid, m) from party P ∈ {I, R}, send (Sent, sid, P , l(m) ) to the adversary. In addition, if P is active then send a private delayed output (Sent, sid, P , m) to the other party in {I, R}. In this case, S can perform the simulation perfectly. That is, the view of the environment Z when interacting with S HYB and π OFE has the same distribution as that of Z when interacting with S and the ideal protocol for F FE .
It then sends (Verification
Next, we construct S assuming party corruption. Since all messages are sent by using F SCS in π OFE , it is only necessary to consider the case where S HYB instructs a corrupted party to send modified data to F SCS . Cases where S HYB instructs a corrupted party to register a modified key to F REG or instructs a corrupted party to sign a modified message by F SIG are similar to the case described above. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we constructed an optimistic fair exchange protocol that is applicable to any digital signature by prescribing three forms of signatures, namely presignature, post-signature and notarised signature. We set the expiration date for the presignature, and thus realised the timely termination of the protocol. Next, we defined the fair exchange functionality F (prop A , prop B , verify) FE in the universal composability framework, and constructed an optimistic fair exchange protocol that UC-realises the fair exchange functionality in the (F SIG , F REG , F SCS )-hybrid model by slightly modifying the protocol mentioned above.
